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At the dawn of the 21
st century, property and equity ownership are spread more broadly across 
the population than they once were. One consequence of this is that asset price booms and 
crashes now have a direct impact on general welfare. The fact that bubbles distort nearly all 
economic decisions gives policymakers a stronger interest in asset price stability. In this essay I 
examine the theoretical and empirical case for the existence of equity and property bubbles, and 
then summarize the economic distortions that they create. The evidence suggests increasing our 
attention on property prices. I go on to discuss the possible policy responses, including 
examining the consequences of changing the way in which housing is included in standard 
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Nontechnical Summary 
In this article I discuss the role of central bankers with respect to equity and property price 
bubbles. I argue that monetary policymakers have no choice but to face the risks posed by asset 
price bubbles head on. While equity markets are small in most countries, and so stock-price 
bubbles are not of any significance in most of the world, bubbles in housing markets have the 
potential to wreak havoc in developed and emerging market countries alike. And significant 
deviations of exchange rates from fundamentals create problems as well. 
I discuss theoretical contributions regarding the existence of bubbles. I also provide empirical 
evidence that supports the existence of booms followed by crashes. Moreover, I assert that asset 
price bubbles distort nearly all economic decisions of any importance. Wealth effects cause 
consumption to expand rapidly and then collapse. Increases in equity prices make it easier for 
firms to finance new projects, causing investment to boom and then bust. The collateral used to 
back loans is overvalued, so when prices collapse it impairs the balance sheets of financial 
intermediaries that did the lending. The booms tend to raise fiscal revenue, encouraging tax cuts 
and expenditure increases that are politically difficult to reverse when the crash inevitably comes. 
Bubbles clearly compromise the stabilization objectives of central banks. They create volatility in 
consumption, investment, fiscal policy, financial intermediaries’ solvency, and more. In most 
cases, asset price misalignments influence aggregate demand, driving inflation and output up 
during the boom and down during the bust. It seems obvious that monetary policymakers – even 
those whose primary objective is price stability – have no choice but to care. 
Finally, I identify and discuss five suggested responses to asset price bubbles: 
 
1.  Take them into account only insofar as they influence forecasts of future inflation. 
2.  Act only after the bubble bursts, reacting to the fallout of the bubble. 
3.  Lean against the bubble, raising interest rates in an attempt to keep it from enlarging. 
4.  Include housing prices directly in the price index that the central bank targets. 
5.  Look for regulatory solutions both to keep the bubble from developing and to reduce the 
impact of a crash should one occur. 
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1. Introduction 
In the days when equity and property ownership was concentrated among the very wealthy, 
fluctuations in asset values posed few problems for the economy as a whole. Booms and crashes 
occurred, but the burden was borne largely by rich owners of equity and property. For public 
policy aimed at improving the general welfare, these gyrations in asset prices were relatively 
unimportant.
1 But at the dawn of the 21
st century, things are different. In developed countries, 
both property and equity ownership are spread more broadly across the population than they once 
were, so the impact of price bubbles is on general welfare. As a result, policymakers have a 
stronger interest in asset price stability. What should they do about it? When faced with sharp 
movements in equity and property prices that are almost surely unsustainable, how should central 
bankers react? 
It is surprising that so many monetary policymakers are hesitant to address the potential risks to 
their stabilization objectives that are created by asset bubbles. The evidence is not in dispute. 
Bubbles – by which I mean booms followed by crashes – both increase the volatility of growth 
and inflation, and threaten the stability of the financial system. The 2003 IMF World Economic 
Outlook estimates that the average equity price bust lasts for 2½ years and is associated with a 4 
percent GDP loss that affects both consumption and investment. While less frequent and 
somewhat less severe, property (or housing) busts are twice as long and are associated with output 
losses that are twice as large – more on this shortly.
2 
Asset price bubbles distort nearly all economic decisions of any importance. Wealth effects cause 
consumption to expand rapidly and then collapse. Increases in equity prices make it easier for 
firms to finance new projects, causing investment to boom and then bust. The collateral used to 
back loans is overvalued, so when prices collapse it impairs the balance sheets of financial 
intermediaries that did the lending. The booms tend to raise fiscal revenue, encouraging tax cuts 
and expenditure increases that are politically difficult to reverse when the crash inevitably comes. 
It is the job of central bankers to eliminate the sort of economic distress asset price bubbles cause. 
Although the rhetoric has been changing slowly, especially in the case of the responses to the 
Australian and British housing market booms, most central bankers remain extremely reluctant to 
act directly to manage these risks. 
As the IMF evidence makes clear, any discussion of bubbles must distinguish between equity and 
property prices. This is true for several reasons. First, the efficient markets hypothesis is more 
likely to apply to equity than to property. Arbitrage in stocks, which requires the ability to short 
sell, is at least possible. In housing and property, it is not. Second, even in the few countries with 
sizeable equity markets, ownership continues to be highly concentrated among the wealthy – 
people whose consumption decisions are well insulated from the vicissitudes of the stock market. 
By contrast, home ownership is spread much further along the income and wealth distribution. 
                                            
1 The view that the Great Depression was precipitated by the stock market crash of 1929 has not borne the test of 
time. Instead, the consensus today is that proximate cause was flawed monetary policy, combined with the way 
in which the interwar gold standard operated. See, for example, Bernanke (2002) and Cecchetti (1998). 
2 See the excellent essays in Chapter II of IMF (2003) for a summary of the evidence. 4   Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
Finally, in many countries housing purchases are highly leveraged, leaving the balance sheets of 
both households and financial intermediaries exposed to large price declines. This final point 
suggests that the macroeconomic impact of a boom and crash cycle in property prices might be 
larger in countries that have more credit outstanding.
3 
Financial innovation reduces the costs and improves the efficiency of risk shifting. Risk goes to 
those best able to bear it, and the result is smoother consumption. At least, that’s what will 
normally be the case. The difficulty is that with the ability sell risk comes the ability to buy it, so 
individuals who wish to concentrate risk can do so. And this concentration of risk, especially 
inside leveraged financial institutions, can have externalities. It has the potential to create 
financial fragility. The result is that during normal times things will be smoother, but when things 
go badly, they go very badly. 
Asset price booms and busts clearly compromise monetary policymakers’ stabilization objectives. 
Not only do they raise the volatility of inflation and output, but they have the potential to increase 
the risk of very bad events occurring. As the risk managers of the economic and financial system, 
policymakers are forced to care about bubbles. 
It is important to note that asset prices fit naturally into any modern central bank’s policy 
framework. Including them is completely consistent with inflation targeting as it is commonly 
practiced. As Bank of England Governor Mervyn King (2004) has put it, “any (coherent) 
monetary policy can be written as an inflation target plus a response to supply shocks.” That is, 
any functional monetary policy framework must be based on an implicit or explicit inflation target 
combined with a rate at which policymakers intend to bring inflation back to this target following 
shocks that move output and inflation in opposite directions. The more concerned a central bank is 
about deviations from potential output, the less rapidly it will strive to return to the inflation 
target.
4 
The remainder of this essay examines asset price bubbles and their policy implications. Sections 2 
and 3 describe the theory and evidence behind the consensus that there are bubbles. Section 4 
discusses the economic impact of bubbles. This is followed in Section 5 by an examination of the 
difference between housing and equity bubbles. Section 6 presents an evaluation of the policy 
options that have been suggested, and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Do Bubbles Exist? Some Theory 
On 3 June 2005 an American postage stamp printed in 1918, with a face value of 24 US cents, 
sold at auction for $577,500 – nearly three times its November 1988 sale price of $192,500. This 
was obviously no ordinary stamp. It was one of the finest of the 80 to 90 surviving examples of a 
misprinted airmail stamp – the image of a biplane in the middle of the stamp is upside down. 
After the red border had been printed on one printing press, a single sheet of 100 stamps had 
                                            
3 For a somewhat more detailed discussion of the issues and the debate see Cecchetti (2003). 
4 See Svensson (1999). The Brave New World of Central Banking   5 
 
inadvertently been rotated 180 degrees before being sent through a second press to print the image 
of a blue biplane in the center. Since the US Postal Service has never cancelled any of its stamps, 
we know that the stamp will still be honored at its face value – 24 cents. In the language of 
financial economics, an asset with a fundamental value of 24 cents sold for $577,500. Why would 
someone be willing to pay this much for something with so little fundamental value? Especially 
since any prudent person would surely put the stamp into a temperature and humidity controlled 
bank vault immediately.
5 
While it is possible that preferences for having this specific stamp in one’s vault (out of sight) 
have shifted enough to justify a 16.5% compound annual return between the sales in 1998 and 
2005, this seems extremely unlikely. What is more plausible is that the stamp’s buyer believes 
that in a few years someone else will pay more. As LeRoy (2004) forcefully argues, there is a 
strong presumption in favor of bubbles. 
The criticism of the bubble view is based on the efficient markets logic that markets incorporate 
all available information and this automatically eliminates bubbles. But there are many 
circumstances under which the argument fails. The dynamic stories that we tell to explain market 
efficiency are based on arbitrage. And when arbitrage fails, so does market efficiency. In fact, 
even if everyone knows that there is a bubble, there is a broad set of realistic circumstances under 
which arbitrageurs will not eliminate it. 
In a recent paper, Jeremy Stein (2004) constructs just such a model. He starts with the logical 
premise that individual investors cannot identify good from bad money managers. In order to 
signal that they are good and overcome the information asymmetry, managers must allow 
redemptions from the fund being managed – that is, the fund has to be open-ended rather than 
closed-end. And an open-ended fund is exposed to withdrawal if it underperforms its benchmark, 
since investors will monitor short-run performance, taking their money out of a fund that 
underperforms because that is evidence that the manager may be bad. 
To understand the importance of this line of reasoning, consider a bubble in the aggregate equity 
market that is certain to burst. Specifically, imagine that the bubble grows at 5% each quarter, and 
has a 5% probability of bursting each quarter. The existence of the bubble is common knowledge 
among the well-informed fund managers, but their naïve investors aren’t sure about it. Will the 
manager of an open-ended fund take a short position to profit from the bubble? The answer is 
almost surely no. With the bubble growing each quarter, a manager that is long will have a 5% 
return every quarter until the bubble bursts. Alternatively, if the manager sells the market short, 
the fund will lose 5% every quarter until the bubble bursts.
6 Since the fund is open-ended and 
investors worry about manager quality, they will withdraw their money from the fund that sells 
short. In equilibrium, no one sells short, everyone goes long, the benchmark against which 
performance is judged is the bubble return, and arbitrage doesn’t drive prices to fundamentals 
                                            
5 This argument is based on LeRoy (2004). 
6 Even if a manager has the fortitude to take the short position, it can be difficult to maintain. Since the market is 
moving against the position, the manager will have to constantly post additional margin to maintain it. And since 
the lender of the stock can always recall share without notice, there is always the possibility of being closed out 
before the bubble bursts. 6   Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
even though everyone knows the bubble is there.
7 In the end, no one has the combination of a long 
time horizon and deep pockets to eliminate the bubble.  
3. Do Bubbles Exist? Some Evidence 
So much for theory; what about evidence? Thanks to Robert Shiller (2005) we have over 100 
years of data for American equity and housing prices. Starting with the level of prices, we see that 
during the late 1990s real equity prices rose to more than double their historical levels. And for 
housing prices, the Shiller data show that in 2005, US house prices (deflated by the CPI) were 
67% above their 1950–1995 average. Since the standard deviation of real house prices during that 
45 year period was a mere 5 percentage points, the 2000–2005 move is 13 standard deviations in 
size! 
While the raw price data are interesting, it is useful to look at price-earnings ratios. If prices are 
rising because earnings growth has increased, there would be justification for the run-ups that we 
see. (We also know, at least for the case of equity, that a high price-earnings ratio forecasts a low 
future return.) Figure 1 plots both the contemporaneous price-earnings ratio and the ratio of 
current prices to the average of the past 10 years’ earnings (see Shiller 2005 for a discussion of the 
rationale for the averaging). During the tech bubble of the 1990s, a number of observers 
repeatedly pointed to the fact that price-earnings ratios had reached unprecedented levels. 
Multiples that are normally around 30, by the fall of 1997 had nearly reached 50 and were on their 
way to 60. There were only a few explanations for this that are based on economic fundamentals: 
Either dividend growth could have risen significantly or the equity risk premium could have 
fallen. There is no evidence of the former, and the latter is completely inconsistent with survey 
evidence, which shows that investors purchasing stocks did so in anticipation of future price 
appreciation.
8 Not only that, but rough calculations suggest that any price earnings ratio in excess 
of 30 implied a negative equity risk premium! 
                                            
7 It is reasonable to ask why hedge funds can’t profit from this. Hedge fund managers have significant access to 
leverage and few restrictions on their investment strategy, and appear to severely restrict withdrawals. While all 
this may be true, the fact is that the vast majority of hedge funds look for trades that converge rapidly. And 
performance is evaluated at least quarterly. Unfortunately, there is no survey of hedge fund withdrawal policies, 
but anecdotal evidence suggests that they are structured essentially as open-ended funds. Large investors can 
negotiate with the manager to allow for frequent withdrawals in the event of underperformance. While we don’t 
know as much about this as we would like, casual observation suggests that the hedge funds are out there taking 
short positions that would have to be in place for several years before they pay off. 
8 See Cecchetti et. al (2000), chapter 3, for a discussion. The Brave New World of Central Banking   7 
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Source: Data are from http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. Prices divided by the 10-year 
lagged moving average of earnings, not adjusted for share buybacks. 
 
 
Turning to housing, the equivalent to the equity price-earnings ratio is the ratio of the market 
value of the housing stock to its service flow. For the US, the data on the aggregate value of 
residential real estate is constructed by the Federal Reserve Board and reported quarterly in the 
Flow of Funds (the Z.1 release), and the consumption of housing services is computed by the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis in the process of constructing the National Income and Product 
Accounts.
9 The ratio is reported in Figure 2.  
                                            
9 The housing wealth data from the flow of funds is constructed by applying a perpetual inventory method to net 
residential investment and applying the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) matched-
resale price index. The housing service data in the National Income and Product Accounts is based on a survey 
of rental units whose characteristics are matched to those of the owner-occupied residential housing stock. 8   Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 











Source: The ratio of the flow of funds estimate of the value of residential real estate, Table B100 line 
4 plus Table B103 line 4, to the National Income and Product Accounts estimate of the total 
housing services in personal consumption expenditure, Table 2.3.5 line 14. 
 
 
The results from 2000 to 2005 are striking. The Federal Reserve Board estimates that, over that 5-
year period, the value of the (nominal) housing stock has risen 66%, or an incredible $9 trillion. 
(Over this period, US GDP rose from roughly $9.5 trillion to $12 trillion.) Meanwhile mortgage 
debt rose from $5 trillion to $8 trillion. From 2000 to 2004, nominal personal consumption 
expenditure rose $1.7 trillion, or 25%. Putting these together, we see that in 2005 the value of 
housing wealth (both owner occupied and rental) was more than 17½ times the estimates of the 
value of housing services – one-quarter above the 14.2 average of the previous 20 years.
10 
There are two ways that the housing/rent ratio can return to more normal levels: Either housing 
prices can fall, or rents can rise. If the adjustment were to occur completely through rents, they 
would have to rise by roughly one-third. This would have a significant impact on headline (and 
core) inflation. To get a sense of how big the inflation adjustment would be, note that shelter 
accounts for one-third of the headline US Consumer Price Index (CPI). If sale prices of homes 
                                            
10 McCarthy and Peach (2004) argue that recent increases in the prices of US housing can be attributed in large 
part to changes in quality. They note that the ratio of the OFHEO home price index (on which the flow of funds 
data are based) to a constant quality index has risen over 20% from 2000 to 2004. That is, the quality of the 
existing housing stock has been rising at a 5% annual rate. Since housing services are 15% of personal 
consumption expenditure, which is 70% of GDP, this would translate into a 0.5% annual increase in real growth 
through this period. This seems unlikely. The Brave New World of Central Banking   9 
 
were flat for five years, then shelter would have to rise at a steady 5.7% annual rate, or more than 
twice the current (2005) rate of 2.5%. As a result the headline CPI would rise by a full percentage 
point for 5 years! And since shelter is an even bigger component of the CPI excluding food and 
energy, the impact on traditional core inflation would be even larger.
11 Given how unlikely it is 
that policymakers would tolerate this, the only remaining possibility is that the adjustment will 
occur through a collapse of housing prices – that is, the bubble will burst. We will return to the 
policy implications of this line of reasoning later. 
While less extensive than the US data, quarterly equity and housing price information exists for a 
number of countries. A casual look at the data on equity in 19 countries and housing in 17 
countries reveals the following: During an equity bubble, real prices double over a period of 3½ 
years and return to the original level 4 years later. The full cycle is 7 to 8 years long. And a typical 
housing bubble involves a 50 percent real price increase over 3 years, followed by a 25% decline 
over the following 3 years. The full cycle is approximately 6 years long and at the end of the 
crash, housing prices are roughly 10% higher than where they started.  
The conclusion from all of this is that bubbles are relatively common. Measuring them is surely 
difficult but not impossible. When a constellation of factors converge, we can often be fairly 
certain that there is a bubble.  
4. The Economic Distortions Created by Bubbles 
Bubbles exist. They exist in theory and they exist in fact. Both equity and housing prices can go 
through protracted periods where they deviate significantly from any reasonable notion of 
fundamental value – first booming and then crashing. But why do we care? If a bubble just 
involved some rich people becoming richer and then less rich, we probably wouldn’t care much. 
But asset price bubbles create a multitude of distortions in the economy that affect nearly 
everyone. They have an undesirable impact on consumption, investment, the path of fiscal policy, 
and the balance sheets of commercial banks.
12 It is worth examining each of these in turn, if only 
briefly. 
Consumption 
It seems obvious that changes in the value of equity and housing have direct implications for 
household balance sheets. Booms in either equity or property prices drive up the wealth of 
individuals. The natural response to an increase in wealth is to raise consumption. If you are rich, 
you can buy a fancy car, purchase a bigger and flatter television, go on nicer vacations, eat in 
expensive restaurants, and the like. And the data show that this is exactly what happens. 
                                            
11 Because housing is only 15% of personal consumption expenditure (PCE), the impact on the PCE price index 
would be much smaller. 
12 This list could be much longer, including pension fund management and insurance companies. 10   Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
A useful rule of thumb is that a $1 increase in US wealth generates between 2 and 5 cents of 
additional consumption by American households.
13 That is, the marginal propensity to consume 
for wealth is in the range of 0.02 to 0.05. 
As Norman, Sebastia-Barriel, and Weeken (2002) note, the marginal propensity to consume is of 
somewhat less interest than the elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth.
14 They 
emphasize that we care more about the impact of a 10% increase in the value of wealth than we 
do about the number of cents or pence that consumption rises per dollar or pound of additional 
wealth. This is especially true of equity wealth, since the sizes of equity markets vary so widely 
across countries. Bertaut (2002) reports that, at the end of 2001, total equity market capitalization 
equaled 153% of GDP in the UK, but only 59% of GDP in Germany. To understand the 
importance of this, consider the impact of a 10% increase in equity prices on consumption in each 
country, assuming that the marginal propensity to consume is the same. The estimated impact in 
the UK would be roughly three times as large as that in Germany.
15  
This highlights the importance of thinking about housing and equity separately. There are two 
reasons for this. First, equity prices are substantially more volatile than housing prices, so a 
change in the former is much less likely to be permanent than a change in the latter. Reasonably, 
households respond more aggressively to changes in wealth that they perceive to be permanent.
16 
Second, as mentioned earlier, equity ownership tends to be concentrated among the wealthy – 
people who are much less likely to adjust their consumption levels. Housing ownership, by 
contrast, is distributed more broadly. And while the quality of housing and the concentration of 
ownership varies across countries, the differences are far less dramatic.  
Turning to the evidence, using data from 14 developed countries Case, Quigley, and Shiller 
(2005) estimate that a one percent increase in housing wealth raises consumption by between 0.11 
and 0.17 percent. By contrast, they find that the stock-market wealth elasticity of consumption is 
substantially smaller, only 0.02. 
Investment 
Equity bubbles distort investment decisions. In his excellent book Dot.con John Cassidy (2002) 
recounts a series of stories about the issuance of stock in companies with little or no commercial 
viability and subsequent inefficient use of the funds.
17 Prices are supposed to provide signals for 
the allocation of resources in the economy. Higher priced items are more valuable and so attract 
                                            
13 See, for example, Norman, Sebastia-Barriel and Weeken (2002). 
14 The elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth is equal to the marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth times the ratio of wealth to consumption. 
15 Careful econometric estimates show an even larger disparity. Bertaut (2002) reports that a 10% increase in the 
stock market creates a 0.5 to 1.0% increase in consumption in the long run in the US and UK, but only 0.07 in 
Germany, where the equity is less than 60% of GDP. 
16 Kishor (2005) estimates that while 98% of the change in housing wealth is permanent, only 55% of the change 
in financial wealth is. This suggests that the housing wealth effect should be roughly twice the stock-market 
wealth effect.  
17 Cassidy’s appendix contains an eye-opening list of all the IPOs during the late 1990s, complete with the initial 
offer price of the shares, the maximum price, and the price when the book was published – often zero! The Brave New World of Central Banking   11 
 
more resources. The price of a firm’s equity is supposed to give us information about future 
profitability. High prices mean better prospects down the road.  
In theory, the system will allocate capital to its most socially productive uses. But the theory only 
works when prices correctly reflect fundamental values. That is, when markets are efficient (as 
discussed earlier). Bubbles destroy all of that, distorting the information content of the price 
system. 
During the internet bubble in the late 1990s, American investment was grossly distorted. High 
technology firms were able to raise funds easily, while traditional companies had a difficult time. 
When the crash came, equipment and buildings were abandoned, and people lost their jobs. In 
retrospect the equipment should never have been purchased; the buildings should not have been 
built; and the people should have kept their previous jobs. And when it was all over, the 
investment boom turned into an investment bust. 
The impact was striking. From 1993 to 2000 nonresidential fixed investment contributed an 
average of more than one percentage point per year to growth. In 2001, business investment 
brought growth down by one-half of one percentage point. The swing was huge – much larger 
than in the 1990 recession – and the proximate cause was the stock market bubble. 
In thinking about the impact of the internet bubble on the path of aggregate US investment, we 
should also take care to note its impact on measured productivity growth rates and resulting 
estimates of potential GDP growth. Equity prices did not explode across the board in the late 
1990s. The bubble’s effects were concentrated on high-technology companies. These were 
companies that invested heavily in computer hardware and software – a part of the economy with 
extremely high productivity growth. These investments were not socially productive, and the 
resources should have gone elsewhere. As an accounting matter, more investment in high 
productivity growth sectors raises current GDP growth, estimates of potential GDP, and measured 
aggregate productivity growth. All of this makes it harder for monetary policymakers to gauge the 
appropriate level for interest rates. 
Fiscal Policy 
Political environments differ around the world, but there is one constant: It is always easier to cut 
taxes than to raise them. This fact, when combined with the dynamics of a bubble, can be very 
damaging. Since asset price booms increase both income and consumption, they tend to raise tax 
revenues. Flush with resources, politicians increase spending and cut taxes. But when the bubbles 
burst, revenues fall, creating fiscal deficits that are very difficult to correct.  
In the US case, a particularly dramatic example is the increase in reported taxable capital gains. 
Comparisons are made difficult by changes in tax law, but during 1999 and 2000 the capital gains 
reported by individuals for the purpose of personal income tax were roughly twice what they were 
in both 1996 and 2001. The difference between 2000 and 2001 resulted in a revenue decline on 
the order of $60 billion, which is roughly 4 percent of US Federal Government revenue at that 
time. At this writing, the necessary American fiscal consolidation has not yet occurred. 12   Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
Commercial Banks 
Banking is critical to the operation of modern economies. Without financial intermediaries to 
channel funds from savers to investors the entire economic system would collapse. And we know 
from hard experience that a healthy banking system is not only indispensable, but also fragile.  
Asset price bubbles can bring out financial system fragility. This is true even when banks are 
precluded from owning equity directly, as they are in many countries. The problem is that assets 
often serve as collateral for loans. Housing is the classic example. When housing markets boom, 
banks lend. When housing markets crash, borrowers default and banks are left with collateral that 
is worth less than the outstanding principal of the loan. 
In the emerging market countries, exchange rate misalignments can result in similar problems. 
This is either because of the currency mismatch on the balance sheet of the intermediaries 
themselves (something that I hope we have learned how to avoid), or because of the currency 
mismatch between the revenues and expenses of the banking system’s debtors.  
In recent years, financial regulators have worked very hard to set up rules and oversight 
mechanisms that ensure bank solvency. And in the aftermath of the internet bubble, US 
commercial banks faired quite well. After building up significant capital during the 1990s, 
financial intermediaries barely felt the collapse of the stock market. The same may not be true if 
there is a housing crash. 
Again focusing on the US, since there is data and I know the case the best, we can look at recent 
experience. From 2000 to 2005, the level of mortgage debt in the US increased by just over $4 
trillion – a 66% rise. Of this, $1.5 trillion, or nearly 40%, has landed on the balance sheets of 
commercial banks. So, by early 2005, mortgage loans plus marketable securities backed by 
mortgages accounted for 43.7% of total bank assets – a dramatic increase from the 37.5% at the 
beginning of 2000.
18 While the risk inherent in this balance structure may be hedged, it could also 
create a large problem should house prices crash. 
And there’s more! 
The list of distortions created by bubbles doesn’t end with those to consumption, investment, 
fiscal policy, and bank balance sheets. Another, more subtle, difficulty comes from the fact that 
higher investment during the boom can drive up observed real growth, raising the apparent 
productive capacity of the economy. The problem is that some portion of the investment during 
the boom should not have been undertaken. That is, if prices had been correct these projects 
would not have had positive internal rates of return. When prices fell, many of these investments 
were abandoned – we all recall the pictures of warehouses piled high with discarded computer 
equipment. This makes potential GDP look higher than it actually is. For policymakers this 
creates the risk of trying to stabilize growth at too high a level. For the rest of us it means overly 
optimistic expectations about growth of income and consumption. 
                                            
18 Data are all from the Flow of Funds, tables L10 (line 22) and L109 (lines 1, 7, and 13). The Brave New World of Central Banking   13 
 
In summary, bubbles clearly compromise the stabilization objectives of central banks. They create 
volatility in consumption, investment, fiscal policy, financial intermediaries’ solvency, and more. 
In most cases, asset price misalignments influence aggregate demand, driving inflation and output 
up during the boom and down during the bust. It seems obvious that monetary policymakers – 
even those whose primary objective is price stability – have no choice but to care.
19 
5. The Difference Between Equity and Housing Bubbles 
It is worth returning to consumption wealth effects at least briefly. As I emphasized earlier, the 
reaction to changes in the value of equity is typically much smaller than the consumption reaction 
to an equivalent percentage change in the value of housing. This is as it should be. When stock 
prices rise, it usually signals improved future profitability. Faster growth means higher incomes 
and more resources to devote to current (and future) consumption. Equity markets may be fickle, 
often giving one day and taking back the next, but sustained movements really do signal changes 
in future growth. 
Contrast this with housing. We all have to live somewhere. When home prices rise it does not 
signal any increase in the quantity of economy-wide output. While someone with a bigger house 
could sell it and move into a smaller one, there must be someone else on the other side of the 
trade. That is, for each person trading down and taking wealth out of their house, someone is 
trading up and putting wealth in. And renters planning to purchase should save more. All of this 
should cancel out, so that in the aggregate there is no change! 
Put another way, people own their homes to hedge the risk arising from potential changes in the 
price of purchasing housing services. They want to ensure that they can continue to live in the 
same size home. A rise in property prices means people are consuming more housing, not that 
they are wealthier. 
This logic is clear. Even so, when researchers look at individuals they see a large effect.
20 Since 
individuals view housing wealth increases as more likely to be permanent than increases in stock-
market wealth, consumption reacts by roughly twice as much. The best guess is that for the 
American economy as a whole, the $9 trillion increase in residential-real-estate wealth from 2000 
to 2005 translated into an increase of $200 billion in consumption – enough to push GDP up 1½% 
per year. 
                                            
19 To keep things manageable, I have said nothing about exchange rate misalignments. This is not because I 
believe them to be unimportant. In fact, it is easy to see how non-fundamental movements in exchange rates will 
distort the allocation of investment and consumption. If a country’s currency is overvalued, for example, import-
competing industries will be decimated as domestic consumers shift to foreign produced goods. When things 
return to normal, the industrial structure will have to go through a costly adjustment.  
20 Campbell and Cocco (2005) note a distributional impact. Housing wealth changes have a much bigger impact 
on the old than on the young. Somewhat paradoxically – at least from a macroeconomic perspective – they find 
virtually no effect on young renters. The renters experience both an income and substitution effect, which cancel 
out. The problem is that if the young are planning to purchase less housing, why did the price rise in the first 
place? 14   Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
Is the increase in consumption justified? Well, it depends. If the consumption and housing price 
increases are both a consequence of higher estimated long-run growth, then the answer is yes. 
That is, if everyone now expects higher future incomes, then they will demand more housing 
along with more of everything else, and there is no bubble. So, if the house price boom is 
accompanied by an increase in the rate of growth of potential output, then it is not a bubble. An 
equity price boom would have to accompany this as well. And, importantly, this would likely 
imply an increase in the long-run real interest rate, too. So, if housing, equity, and bonds all boom 
at the same time, we probably need not be concerned. 
In the absence of evidence that the economy’s growth trend has risen, a housing price boom 
should not drive up consumption. The fact that it does creates a problem for policymakers. The 
transitory consumption increase represents reduced saving that must be made up with lower 
consumption in the future. And the problem is that it is created by the increase in house prices; 
one that might properly be characterized as inflation. 
6. Policy Options 
What is to be done about all of this? When confronted with evidence that housing prices are far 
from fundamentals, what can monetary policymakers do? Given the damage that bubbles do, the 
idea that central bankers should completely ignore them seems absurd on its face. But what should 
they do?  
In recent years, a broad set of academics and policymakers have addressed this question. There 
are now so many papers that examine the connection between asset prices and monetary policy 
that it would be foolhardy for me to try to summarize them all. Instead, I will identify five 
suggested responses: 
1.  Take them into account only insofar as they influence forecasts of future inflation. 
2.  Act only after the bubble bursts, reacting to the fallout of the bubble. 
3.  Lean against the bubble, raising interest rates in an attempt to keep it from enlarging. 
4.  Include housing prices directly in the price index that the central bank targets. 
5.  Look for regulatory solutions both to keep the bubble from developing and to reduce the 
impact of a crash should one occur. 
 
Before examining each of these, I would like to be absolutely as clear as possible about one thing. 
My previous coauthors and I agree that policymakers should not target asset prices per se, and we 
have said so repeatedly. Let me quote from Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2002): 
“It is important to emphasize that … we are recommending that while [central banks] 
might react to asset price misalignments, they must not target them.” [Emphasis is in 
original]. 
The debate is explicitly not about central bank objectives. It is about how to go about achieving 
whatever combination of price and output stability policymakers are aiming to deliver. The The Brave New World of Central Banking   15 
 
proposal that interest rates respond to bubbles is completely consistent with inflation targeting or 
any other policy framework based on standard stabilization objectives. 
1. React only if the bubble changes inflation forecasts 
Turning to the list of five possibilities, Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) are the original and 
most influential proponents of the first strategy. They note that directly reacting to asset price 
booms carries with it the risk of destabilizing both real output and inflation. Cecchetti, Genberg, 
Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000) and Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2002) take issue with this 
conclusion, noting that Bernanke and Gertler study only very simply monetary policy rules that 
exclude the possibility of interest rate responses to output gaps. Once the universe of possible 
policy rules is expanded, reacting to asset price bubbles will usually be stabilizing.  
The intuition for this conclusion is straightforward. The simplest way to think about monetary 
policy is that, to achieve their stabilization objectives, central bankers adjust their interest rate 
instrument in response to shocks. Shocks are things like changes in consumer or business 
sentiment, movements in international commodity prices, and the like. In this framework, bubbles 
are just another type of shock to which interest rate policy should react. And, as an empirical 
matter, Cecchetti et. al (2000) suggest that reacting to bubbles over and above their impact on 
forecasts of future inflation yields more stable inflation and real growth. 
2. Clean up after the bubble bursts 
Alan Greenspan (2002) has articulated the view that there is really nothing to be done ex ante, so 
the only policy prescription is to clean up the mess ex post. Chairman Greenspan’s argument has 
two parts. First, he argues that only after it bursts can a policymaker be sufficiently certain that a 
bubble was present. And second, “that no low-risk, low-cost, incremental monetary tightening 
exists that can reliably deflate a bubble.” (Greenspan 2002, p. 5). The only remaining option is to 
respond once the dust settles.  
There are three responses to the view that central bankers can’t identify bubbles while they are 
developing. First, earlier in this essay I argued that bubbles can exist in theory and that we can 
detect them in practice. Substantial movements in the ratio of housing price sales to rental values 
(or alternatively, market prices to replacement costs) are a signal of a bubble that central bankers 
would do well to heed.
21 And, as Borio and Lowe (2002) point out, asset price bubbles tend to be 
accompanied by other financial imbalances including buildups in debt and a high level of money 
growth.
22 Second, just because something is hard to measure is no reason to ignore it. Cecchetti, 
Genberg, and Wadhwani (2002) argue that it is surely no more difficult to measure asset price 
misalignments than it is to estimate potential GDP, and that there are surely times when there are 
obvious bubbles. Uncertainty should lead to caution, not paralysis. 
                                            
21 As Bean (2003) emphasizes, mechanical responses to changes in asset prices alone – even those that are 
accompanied by proportional changes in rents, earnings or the like – would be a mistake.  
22 During a panel discussion at a conference in 2002, ECB Executive Board Member Otmar Issing justified the 
use of the reference value for money growth in part as one early indicator that a bubble may be developing.  16   Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
And third, it is hard to accept the Greenspan view that central bankers have no sound policy 
options when faced with bubbles. Recent experience in Australia suggests that higher interest 
rates, combined with explanations that focus on the view that housing price increases are 
unsustainable, can do the job. After increasing at a rate of 10% per year for six straight years, in 
early 2004 prices simply stopped rising and have been stable for the past 18+ months. Such an 
experience certainly suggests that we should be more optimistic than Chairman Greenspan’s 
comments suggest. 
3. Use interest rate policy to lean against the bubble 
Since 2000, Cecchetti et. al have argued in favor of a policy of leaning against asset price bubbles 
similar to the one adopted by the Reserve Bank of Australia in 2003. This position has been 
supported by a growing body of theoretical literature supporting the idea that asset prices have a 
place in monetary policy rules. For example, Dupor (2002) builds a model with sticky prices in 
which firms overinvest in physical capital when there is an equity bubble. The model is a complex 
one in which nominal rigidities create problems with allocations within the economy on a specific 
date, while bubbles distort saving and investment decisions over time. When faced with these two 
problems, but only a single interest-rate instrument, Dupor shows that optimal monetary policy 
requires reacting to both distortions. When faced with a bubble, the best action is to raise interest 
rates, reducing the marginal product of capital, thereby depressing equity prices. That is, the 
optimal policy is to lean against the bubble.
23 
Moving from theory to evidence, Cecchetti (2003) presents results suggesting that the Federal 
Reserve did raise interest rates modestly in reaction to the stock price boom of the late 1990s. As 
suggested earlier, asset price misalignments or bubbles can be thought of as just another form of 
destabilizing shock to which policymakers need to react. Equity or property (or exchange rate) 
movements shift aggregate demand, driving the output gap and inflation up or down together. In 
principle, monetary policy can neutralize these shocks, since it too can move the output gap and 
inflation in the same direction. 
Gruen, Plumb, and Stone (2003) make a very powerful argument that leaning against a bubble is 
simply impractical. The difficulty arises from the fact that interest rates influence economic 
activity with a lag, but affect the bubble immediately. Because of the first of these, as output falls 
following the bursting of a bubble, policymakers would like to have interest rates low for some 
period before a crash. But lowering interest rates reduces the probability of the bubble bursting, 
causing it to become larger. Gruen et. al proceed to show that successful stabilization policy 
requires the central bank to detect the bubble when it is just developing – something that most 
people agree is nearly impossible. This very convincing line of reasoning leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that interest rates are probably not the right instrument for the job! 
                                            
23 Bean (2003) suggests that this is likely a general result in New Keynesian macroeconomic models. He goes on 
to show that the possibility of credit crunches, which are analogous to asset price busts, leads to less 
accommodative policy paths. That is, generally higher interest rates.  The Brave New World of Central Banking   17 
 
4. Include housing prices in the target index 
Next on the list of possible responses to bubbles is the inclusion of housing prices directly in the 
price index targeted by the central bank. (I use the term “target” loosely to mean either an explicit 
or implicit objective.) Bryan, Cecchetti, and O’Sullivan (2002) suggest that the value of existing 
homes should have a weight in the price index used to measure aggregate inflation.
24 And in some 
countries, like Ireland, it appears that the weight should be large.  
Figure 3: Including House Prices in the Inflation Measure 








1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
PCE Inflation PCE w/ OFHEO  
Source: The dark line is the 4-quarter percentage change in the all-items Personal Consumption 
Expenditure Price Index from the National Income and Product Accounts Table 2.3.4. These 
data are from www.bea.gov. The gray line replaces the housing component in the PCE price 
index with the OFHEO matched-resale price index, the “HPI” from www.ofheo.gov. The 
series, computed by the author, uses weights generated by regressing the quarterly change in 
the aggregate index on inflation in eight components, and then substituting the OFHEO 
index for the PCE housing index. 
 
 
Housing represents a large portion of consumption expenditure – 15 to 20% is standard – so it 
can’t simply be ignored. The response in the US has been to include an estimate of the price of 
housing services that accrue to owners occupying their own homes from a survey of rental units. 
This is good as far as it goes, but it fails to account for movements in market prices of homes that 
are not immediately reflected in the rental market. During periods when home prices are booming, 
rents tend to be depressed, leading to distortions in the index. A solution to this is to assume that 
                                            
24 Bryan, Cecchetti, and O’Sullivan (2002) argue that policymakers should be stabilizing the cost of lifetime 
consumption, not just per period consumption. This leads to the immediate consideration of assets which are the 
prices of entire streams of consumption over a lifetime. It then naturally follows that something like housing, 
which provides a lifetime of housing services, should be included in the price index at its current market price. 18   Stephen G. Cecchetti 
 
the price of housing services is proportional to the cost of the house, and simply substitute current 
market transactions prices in the index. Such a change has a substantial impact on measured 
inflation and hence on policy. I would argue that this is appropriate. 






































Official All-Items RPI RPI w/ HPI
 
Source: The dark line is the UK all-items Retail Price Index and the gray line replaces the RPI 
housing component with the Nationwide UK-wide HPI, monthly seasonally adjusted taken 
from www.nationwide.co.uk/hpi, as calculated by the author. 
 
 
To see how big the impact might be, I have taken a US and a UK price index and replaced the 
housing component with an index of home sale prices.
25 The results are plotted in Figures 3 and 4. 
Over the five years from 2000 to 2005, recomputed inflation based on the Personal Consumption 
Expenditure price index has averaged three-quarters of a percentage point higher than the 
conventional index. For core PCE, excluding food and energy, a similar computation gives a full 
percentage point difference. And since housing has roughly twice the weight in the US CPI than it 
has in the PCE (30% vs. 15%), the difference between those two gauges of inflation would be 
even bigger. 
The UK example is even more striking. The recomputed all-items Retail Price Index registers a 
consistent 2 to 4 percentage points (at an annual rate) of additional inflation since the late 1990s. 
Obviously, targeting an index that includes the acquisition cost of housing would change things 
dramatically. 
                                            
25 These results are approximations, as they are based on assuming the weight on housing is the average weight 
over the 1990 to 2005 sample period. The Brave New World of Central Banking   19 
 
5. Unconventional alternatives 
Are there any alternatives to interest rate policies? The answer is surely yes, and it is time to start 
studying them. To get things started, let me frame the problem as I see it. First, financial 
development is unambiguously a good thing. It promotes economic development, raising the level 
of growth. A well-functioning financial system is an essential precondition for high, sustained real 
growth. It also increases the ability to share risk, providing mechanisms for smoothing 
consumption and investment in the fact of volatile income and sales. The result is lower volatility 
of growth as well. 
But financial development may be a two-edged sword. By providing households with a 
mechanism for increasing leverage, especially through mortgage lending, the financial system 
could be increasing the chances of catastrophe. Ready access to loans allows individuals to bid up 
the prices of existing homes and has the potential to create frenzies that result in booms followed 
by crashes – e.g. bubbles. The risk is that when the bubble bursts there will be a large number of 
defaults. And as we think about housing bubbles, it is important to keep in mind that they tend to 
be geographically concentrated. 
As I have argued, interest rates are likely to be the wrong instrument for addressing the risks 
housing bubbles create. This means looking toward solutions that focus on the lending that 
propels the bubble. There are two possibilities. Either try to restrain the lenders through regulatory 
mechanisms or attempt to restrict the borrowers. The first would involve supervisory adjustments 
to risk-based capital requirements. This is likely to be both complex and ripe for evasion – banks 
could simply sell the loans to willing investors.  
The alternative is to adjust borrower loan qualification requirements to the environment. For 
example, the maximum loan-to-value ratio could depend on deviations in rent-to-sale price ratios 
from their lagged moving average (or on the rate of recent increase). Alternatively, income 
coverage tests could depend on long-term interest rates rather than short-term interest rates. There 
are many possibilities, and we need to explore them. 
Related to this is the issue of financial market structure. Are primarily bank-based financial 
systems more prone to difficulties? Should we strive to increase the importance of secondary 
financial markets? Or, alternatively, move toward narrow banks? The problem with this is that 
financial innovation cuts both ways. By making it easier to trade risk, it means that risk can go 
both to those best equipped to bear it and to those willing to accumulate it. The latter can create 
externalities. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
Monetary policymakers have no choice but to face the risks posed by asset price bubbles head on. 
While equity markets are small in most countries, and so stock-price bubbles are not of any 
significance in most of the world, bubbles in housing markets have the potential to wreak havoc in 
developed and emerging market countries alike. And significant deviations of exchange rates 
from fundamentals create problems as well. 
Severe boom-bust cycles have the potential to dramatically destabilize both inflation and output in 
an economy. They affect consumption, investment, fiscal policy, and the health of financial 
intermediaries. Importantly, the down-side risks that they pose are significant. As the risk 
managers of the economic and financial system, central bankers are bound to focus on these. 
But caring about asset price bubbles is only the first step. Policy is not abstract, it is practical. 
Reacting to equity, property, or exchange rate misalignments means estimating their numerical 
size. This is surely difficult, but as I argue in Cecchetti, Genberg, and Wadhwani (2002), it is both 
essential to forecasting inflation and growth, and unlikely to be more difficult than estimating 
other critical but elusive quantities such as potential GDP. Policymakers do not usually shy away 
from important issues just because the solution is difficult. They should not do it here, either. 
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